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Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with Cross-listing? 
Evidence from China 
Abstract:  
 This study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from 
cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent 
rules regarding corporate governance and a better system of investor protection than the 
mainland market. Hong Kong companies generally provide strong incentives to 
executives via equity-based compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from 
Hong Kong firms about adopting these strong executive incentives?  The evidence from 
this study suggests that changes in top executive compensation are more sensitive to 
sales growth in cross-listed firms than they are in mainland firms without cross-listing. 
However, compared to Hong Kong firms, cross-listed firms are less sensitive to stock 
returns.  Further, this study shows that it is necessary to differentiate between 
state-owned companies and private companies, as cross-listing may have a greater 
impact on executive incentives in state-owned companies than it does in private 
companies.  
Keywords:   Cross-listing      Executive Compensation    Corporate Governance 
JEL code: J3, M5 
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1. Introduction  
Cross-listing refers to situations where firms list their shares on one or more 
foreign stock exchanges in addition to a domestic exchange. The opportunity to raise 
capital from global investors and the promise of increased visibility in the foreign 
markets provide the motivation for firms to cross-list their stock. According to recent 
studies, another important motivation for cross-listing is the so-called “bonding 
hypothesis”. Coffee (1999) was among the first to propose that firms incorporated in a 
country with a less developed stock market can creditably bond themselves by cross 
listing their shares in a more developed foreign stock market.  
So far, empirical evidence on the “bonding” hypothesis comes mostly from 
studies of companies listed in the U.S. For examples, Doidge (2004) finds that cross 
listing is associated with lower private benefit of control; Bauer et al. (2005)  finds that 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. have higher corporate governance ratings than firms 
without a U.S. cross listing; other studies suggest that cross-listing in the U.S. brings 
advantages such as better valuation, lower cost of capital, more scrutiny by financial 
analysts, and greater access to external finance  (Doidge et al., 2004; Hail and Leuz, 
2006; Lang et al., 2003, 2006; Reese and Weisbach, 2002).   
However, there are also studies challenging the “bonding” hypothesis. Licht 
(2001, 2003) questioned the effectiveness of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in enforcing the U.S.’s more stringent corporate governance rules on 
foreign firms. In support of this view, Siegel (2005) found that the SEC’s enforcement 
imposed on Mexican firms cross-listed in the U.S. was generally weak. Furthermore, 
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Licht (2003) argues that firms may actually cross list to avoid strict requirements in 
domestic markets, which is referred to as the “avoiding hypothesis”.  
There are several countries (e.g., Hong Kong) that claim to have levels of 
investor protection on par with that of the U.S. and these countries have attracted an 
increasing and significant number of cross listing firms. Hong Kong is the first choice 
for Chinese companies looking to list their stock on an overseas exchange. In the last 
decade, over 200 Chinese firms have issued initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Hong 
Kong Stock Market, accounting for almost one fourth of all the firms listed in Hong 
Kong.  These companies are either known as “red chip” or “H-share” companies. A 
mainland-China controlled company incorporated and listed in Hong Kong is called a 
“red chip” company; the word red comes from “red China”. Red chips are traded in 
Hong Kong dollars, and financial statements are also reported in HK dollars. H-share 
companies are incorporated in the mainland and approved by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to list in Hong Kong; the letter H stands for Hong 
Kong. H-share companies are traded in Hong Kong dollars, but financial statements are 
reported in RMB Yuan. Recently, the distinctions between H-shares and red chips have 
become blurred. Many mainland-incorporated companies are issued as red chips, such as 
China Mobile, China Insurance and China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC). Thus, 
like many other studies, this paper treats H-share and red chips as one group. 
Although Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, Hong Kong’s economic 
and political systems in general and its security markets in particular remain independent 
from the mainland. The Hong Kong Security and Future Commission (SFC) is the 
regulatory body for listed companies on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In mainland 
China, there are two stock exchanges – one in Shanghai and the other in Shenzhen. 
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Companies listed on either of these two stock exchanges may offer “A shares” to 
domestic investors and “B shares” to foreign investors. The two stock exchanges and 
listed companies are regulated by the CSRC.  
The Company Law of China, enacted in 1994 and with the latest amendment in 
2006, establishes general rules for corporate governance for listed companies. The 
Company Law is further supplemented by the specific regulations of the CSRC.  The 
policies, rules, and regulations in the mainland are viewed as less developed than those 
of Hong Kong. An example lies in the differences in the requirements for independent 
directors to serve on the executive compensation committee of the board. The CSRC 
requires that only one third of directors be independent, and that independent directors 
take their responsibility seriously in important company matters such as executive 
appointment and compensation, and auditing and information disclosure. 1  In 
comparison, Hong Kong SFC regulations are quite detailed and require not only the 
majority of directors be non-executive and independent, but also that the most important 
board committees such as the auditing and executive remuneration committees comprise 
only non-executive directors. 2    
Several studies find that only a small fraction of A-share companies have 
established an executive compensation committee on the board, and the effectiveness of 
the committee is questionable; for those without the committee, the situation is worse 
and executives often set their own salaries (Firth et al., 2006b); HK companies, on the 
other hand, generally establish executive remuneration committees.  These committees 
are composed of non-executive directors and outside experts, and are often more 
independent than the rest of the board (Ho, 2003). Some researchers suggest that the 
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problem of executives colluding with large state shareholders in expropriating minority 
investors is quite serious among A-share companies (Jian and Wong, 2003; Jiang et al., 
2005); others have also questioned the quality of financial disclosure and the 
independence of external auditing of A-share companies (Bao and Chow, 1999; DeFond 
et al., 1999; Wang et al., 2008). Overall, after examining creditor rights, investor rights, 
the rules of law, and corruption, Allen et al. (2005) deem that Hong Kong is among 
countries like the U.S., U.K., Japan, Singapore, and Germany with the best investor 
protection, whereas mainland China ranked among Mexico and Indonesia, which are 
considered to have a poorer investor protection. Similarly, in 2002, CLSA Asia-Pacific 
Markets, the independent brokerage and investment group ranked Hong Kong second in 
their corporate governance rating of Asian countries, and ranked mainland China 
sixteenth (CLSA, 2002). 
 Since Hong Kong appears to have more stringent governance rules and a better 
investor protection than mainland China, executive compensation of HK companies is 
often more sensitive to company performance than that of mainland companies. The 
question is whether cross-listed companies have become assimilated to HK local firms 
in linking executive pay to performance. The stronger executive incentives adopted by 
cross-listed companies may be the result of improvements after cross-listing, or simply 
due to the “selection effect”, i.e. only those companies that are in better condition are 
allowed to be listed in Hong Kong. We cannot disentangle these two effects. Our focus is 
to test whether the overall effect of cross-listing is positive. One distinguishing feature of 
our study is that we set two benchmarks for Chinese companies cross-listed in Hong 
Kong: one is based on executive incentives of mainland A-share companies; the other is 
                                                                                                                                             
1 CSRC “Advice on Establishing the Independent Director System in Listed Companies”, 2001[102] 
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based on executive incentives of HK local companies. The comparison of these three 
groups reveals whether cross-listed companies have caught up with HK companies or 
still lag behind, and also whether cross-listed companies have shown improvement over 
A-share companies.  
Our study is most closely related to Ke et al. (2008) who compared mainland 
companies cross-listed in Hong Kong to those without a HK cross-listing in terms of the 
sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance. However, there are several 
important differences between our paper and Ke et al. (2008). First, our study includes 
an additional comparison between cross-listed companies and Hong Kong local 
companies. Second, and more importantly, Ke et al. (2008) used the cross-sectional data 
for 2003, while we managed to obtain the executive compensation data of mainland, 
cross-listed, and HK companies for 2004-2006. Thus, we are able to estimate the change 
regressions.  The advantage of the change regression lies in the control of unobserved 
firm-specific characteristics. The omission of these variables in the level regression 
causes bias in the estimates. In the change regression, the unobserved firm-specific 
characteristics drop out after first differencing. Third, before 2004, there was no data 
available for individual executive compensation, and hence Ke et al. (2008) used the 
total compensation of the three or five highest paid executives and directors in a 
company. 3 Using 2004-2006 data, we employ individual executive compensation in the 
analysis. 
Our work also benefits from previous studies that have extensively investigated 
the relationship of executive pay or turnover to performance of A-share companies, such 
                                                                                                                                             
2 SFC, http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/html/EN/aboutsfc/corporate/governance/governance.html 
3 For mainland companies, the total compensation of the three highest paid executives was disclosed 
before 2004, while for Hong Kong companies, that of the five highest paid executive was disclosed. 
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as Chi and Wang (2009), Firth et al. (2006a, b), Kato and Long (2006), Aivazian et al. 
(2005), and Mengistae and Xu (2004). In methodology, we follow Kaplan (1994) who 
compared the sensitivity of top executive rewards to firm performance of Japanese 
companies with that of U.S. companies. 
 Our findings are mixed. When firm performance is measured by sales growth, 
executive compensation is more sensitive to performance in cross-listed companies than 
in mainland companies without cross-listing. Cross-listed companies have caught up 
with HK firms in linking executive pay to sales growth, but in terms of incentives tied to 
stock returns, cross-listed firms still lag behind. The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 describes data, sample selection, and variables; Section 3 presents the 
results, and Section 4 summarizes and concludes the paper.  
2. Data  
  The panel data of mainland, cross-listed and HK companies from 2004 to 2006 
are used in this study. For HK-listed companies, before fiscal year 2004, executive 
compensation was broken down into bands of HK$500,000 beginning at HK$1,000,000, 
and the number of directors whose total remuneration fell into each band was disclosed; 
after 2005, regulations require that the exact amount of compensation be disclosed. 
Since the bandwidth was rather broad, the compensation data of HK executives had a 
relatively large measurement error before 2004. Therefore, we use data from 2004 to 
2006 (the latest available year).  For mainland listed companies, the disclosure 
requirement for executive compensation has been rather consistent over time: the 
compensation is also reported in bands, but the bandwidth is relatively small, 10,000 
RMB Yuan or less.   For consistency, we used data from the same years for mainland and 
HK-listed companies. The HK-listed companies include both HK local companies and 
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cross-listed mainland companies. As of the end of December 2004, there were 114 
H-share and 88 red chip firms listed in Hong Kong.  Thus, the sample of cross-listed 
companies consists of these 202 companies. 
To compare cross-listed companies to mainland and Hong Kong companies, we 
constructed a sample of A-share companies that matched the cross-listed companies in 
industry and size, and we constructed a sample of similarly matched HK local 
companies. The primary reason we selected samples matched for industry and size is 
that industry and size are the two most important factors that impact firm performance 
and executive compensation. Another reason is to ease the data collection burden. The 
financial information and executive compensation figures disclosed by individual 
mainland companies in their annual reports have been coded and put into databases by 
various data consulting companies such as GTA, CSMAR, and GTI. Financial data of 
Hong Kong companies are available from Datastream. However, compensation and firm 
characteristics data of cross-listed and Hong Kong companies have to be hand-picked 
from company statements. There are over 1000 listed companies on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange so hand-picking data for all the companies for all three years would be 
an enormous job. For this reason, we decide to first limit the sample by industry and size, 
and then pick the data from company reports for the smaller sample.  
  The process of matching is as follows: The industry type of cross-listed 
companies (H-shares and red chips) is obtained from Datastream. For each of the 202 
cross-listed companies, we first select A-share firms of the same industry by matching 
the industry classification code of CSRC with that of Datastream. 4  Next we identify the 
                                                 
4 CSRC has classified A-share firms into 13 industries, including agriculture and forestry; mining; 
manufacturing; utility (water, gas, and electricity manufacturing and supply); construction; transportation 
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one A-share company that is most similar to the cross-listed company in terms of sales 
revenue and total assets. We use sales revenue and total assets as the indicators of firm 
size. This way we were able to obtain a matched sample that contains 202 mainland 
companies. The sample of HK local companies is constructed following the same 
process mentioned above.  Specifically, for each of the cross-listed companies, we 
selected one HK local company in the same industry based on the Datastream industry 
code that was closest in sales revenue and total assets. The final sample contains 202 
matched HK companies. Thus, we obtained three samples: 
Mainland:  Mainland firms without HK cross listing. The sample size is 202. We use 
letter “A” to indicate this sample.   
Cross-listed: Mainland companies traded in Hong Kong, including red chips and 
H-share companies.  The sample size is 202. We use “HR” to denote this sample. 
Hong Kong: Hong Kong local firms incorporated and traded on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. The sample size is 202. “HK” is used to denote this sample.  
 The data for executive compensation and firm characteristics of mainland 
companies are obtained from GTA, and those of cross-listed and HK local companies 
are hand picked from company statements obtained from the website of the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (www.hkex.com.hk). The final dataset contains information on the 
following variables: Cash compensation is the sum of an executive’s annual salary and 
bonus in RMB 10,000 Yuan. Since the executive compensation for mainland companies 
is reported in intervals, we use the median of the reported interval. To be consistent, we 
convert executive compensation of cross-listed and HK companies to RMB Yuan based 
                                                                                                                                             
and storage; information technology; wholesale and retail; finance and insurance; real estate; social 
service; media and culture; and integrated (multi-industry).   
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on the appropriate exchange rate. We take the logarithm of Cash Compensation and 
calculate the difference between year t and t-1, and name the new variable Change in 
cash compensation. Management shareholding is defined as the total shares held by the 
top three executives of a company at the end of year t.  
We use several variables to measure firm performance: Market value of equity is 
the total market value of tradable shares at the fiscal year end and stated in millions of 
RMB Yuan; Stock return is annual stock return from the first month of fiscal year t to the 
end of the fiscal year, adjusted for dividends; Sales is net sales revenue for the fiscal year 
t , also stated in millions of RMB Yuan; Sales growth is the change in the logarithm of 
sales from year t -1 to t;  ROA is net income divided by total assets at year end. To 
overcome extreme values, we winsorize sales growth and ROA to the range of [-20, 20]. 
Change in ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t; Loss is a dummy variable that 
equals one if net income in year t or t-1 is negative.  
The dataset also contains several variables that characterize the governance 
structures of the companies: Ownership concentration is the percentage of shares held 
by the largest shareholder; State is a dummy variable that equals one if the largest 
shareholder is the state. In addition, Years of listing refers to the number of years a firm 
has been listed as of December 31, 2007. 
Table 1 shows financial performance, executive compensation, and ownership 
structure of mainland, cross-listed, and HK companies. To avoid extreme values, we use 
the Wilcoxon signed rank test of differences in median for continuous variables and 
report Z-values. For dummy variables, Chi-square frequency tests are used to test the 
differences, and Chi-square statistics are reported. The top panel shows that executives 
of HK firms earned the average compensation of 4.8 million RMB Yuan per year during 
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2004-2006 (the median is 2.5 million Yuan), nearly 15 times that earned by executives 
of mainland  firms (10 times the median). Executives of cross-listed companies received 
an average cash compensation of 1.8 million Yuan (median = 0.77 million Yuan), which 
is significantly higher than that earned by mainland executives but lower than that 
earned by HK executives. However, executives in cross-listed companies received 
larger increases in cash compensation during 2004-2006, compared to their counterparts 
in mainland and HK firms. The average annual increase in compensation is 16 percent 
for cross-listed companies, while it is 7 percent for HK and mainland firms.   
Panel A also shows that top three executives of HK firms own 42 percent of 
their company’s stock, while their counterparts in mainland China own only 0.01 
percent.  The top executives of cross-listed companies own slightly more shares than 
executives of mainland companies, but the shares they own are much fewer than those 
held by executives of HK firms.   From this perspective, financial incentives offered to 
executives in cross-listed companies are more similar to those in mainland companies 
than to those in HK firms. Executives of cross-listed firms are still mostly motivated by 
short-term cash compensation rather than stock ownership or options.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows company performance by various measures. The 
average equity value and sales revenue is much higher for cross-listed companies than 
for mainland and HK firms. A few cross-listed companies, such as PetroChina, China 
Eastern Airlines and Huaneng Power, are large in terms of assets and sales and also are 
the respective industry leaders, which may drive up the average value for cross-listed 
firms. As can be seen, the median value of equity and sales of the three types of 
companies is more similar than the mean value, with HK firms being a little smaller.  
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Both cross-listed and HK companies outperform mainland companies in stock 
returns and ROA. The differences between HK and cross-listed firms in these two 
performance indicators are small and statistically insignificant. Cross-listed companies 
had an average sales growth of 22 percent (18 percent at the median), which is the 
highest among the three groups of companies. On the other hand, mainland companies 
had the lowest percentage of loss in that 22 percent of mainland companies had a 
negative net income in the previous two years compared to 23 percent for cross-listed 
companies and 29 percent for HK companies.  The difference in the frequency of loss 
between mainland and cross-listed companies is insignificant. For both mainland and 
cross-listed companies, this frequency is substantially lower than that of HK companies. 
In summary, the evidence is rather mixed as to which type of firms have the best 
performance: HK companies perform the best in stock returns and ROA; cross-listed 
companies have the strongest sales growth; mainland companies have the lowest 
percentage of loss; the three groups do not differ significantly in the change of ROA. 
Panel C shows other characteristics of firms. An important indicator of a 
company’s governance structure is concentration of ownership. Table 1 shows that 
cross-listed companies have the most concentrated ownership structure, followed by HK 
companies and then by mainland companies. Overall, the percentage of shares held by 
the largest shareholder is rather high for all three groups of companies. The tabulation 
also shows that for 76 percent of mainland companies, the largest shareholder is the state, 
while for HK companies, that percentage is zero. Among the 202 cross-listed companies, 
82 percent are state-controlled.  Finally, HK companies in general have been listed 
longer than mainland and cross-listed companies. Thus far, descriptive results have 
shown that the executive compensation level of cross-listed companies lies between that 
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of mainland and HK companies. The question remains whether executive compensation 
of cross-listed companies is more or less tied to firm performance than that of mainland 
and HK firms.   
3. Regression Results  
 To check consistency with previous research (Ke et al., 2008) and also to see 
how the results change when controlled for firm fixed effects, we begin our analysis by 
estimating the regression of the compensation level on firm characteristics and 
performance. The regression is estimated for 2004, 2005, and 2006 separately and also 
for the three years jointly with control for year dummies. The results are reported in 
Table 2. Consistent with descriptive results, executive compensation of HK companies 
is significantly higher than that of cross-listed firms which is in turn much higher than 
that of A-share firms. The coefficient estimates for the interaction of A, HR and HK with 
performance suggest that A-share executive compensation is sensitive to ROA. This 
finding confirms Ke et al. (2008) who used 2003 data and obtained the similar results.  
However, different from Ke et al. (2008), we find that A-share company executive 
compensation is also sensitive to stock returns, especially in the more recent years (in 
2005 and 2006). These differences could be due to different years of data used in our 
study compared to those used in Ke et al. (2008) and the level regression may also be 
sensitive to the specific year chosen. 5  
The level regression uses cross-firm variation to identify the effect of firm 
performance on executive compensation and it is likely to be subject to omitted variable 
                                                 
5 Ke et al. (2008) studied only A-share and cross-listed companies and did not have data of Hong Kong 
local firms, but they distinguished H-share and red chips among the cross-listed companies and estimated 
the regression for state and non-state controlled companies separately. To make a further comparison with 
Ke et al. (2008), we estimate the same models using A, H-share, and red chip shares only. Our 2004 results 
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bias. Although by controlling for as many firm characteristics as possible the omitted 
variable bias may be reduced, there are still some unobserved firm characteristics for 
which we do not control. The fixed effect model uses within-firm variation over time to 
identify the effect, and hence, could avoid bias due to omitted variables that are time 
constant. The fixed effect model may be estimated by first differencing the data and 
using ordinary least squares. Thus, we specify the following model:  
0 1 2 1 3 .it it it itCash Compensation Performance Performance Xβ β β β ε−Δ = + Δ + Δ + Δ +  
We adopt four measures of firm performance: (1) stock returns; (2) sales growth; (3) 
change in ROA; (4) loss. As can be seen, the measures indicate the change in the 
performance. In addition, the first variable is an external market performance measure 
while the rest are internal accounting performance measures.   Following Kaplan (1994), 
we also include one-year lagged values for stock returns, sales growth and changes in 
ROA to capture any lagged effect of firm performance on executive compensation. Since 
loss indicates a negative net income in either or both of the previous two years, the 
lagged value of loss is not necessary. We estimate the model, entering the four 
performance variables separately as well as including them all together. itXΔ  are other 
measures on changes in firm characteristics and are included in the regression as control 
variables. Specifically, the control variables are the changes in leverage and the changes 
in the logarithm of total assets, as well as year dummy variables to control for year fixed 
effects. 
 We estimate the above equation for mainland, cross-listed, and HK companies 
separately and report coefficient estimates of 1β  and 2β in Table 2. The left-hand side of 
                                                                                                                                             
are similar to those of Ke et al. (2008) estimated for 2003,  which show that executive compensation of 
 16
Table 2 shows the estimates for each performance measures with separate adjusted R2 
reported. The right-hand side reports the estimates when all the performance variables 
and their lagged values are included. To test whether the estimates differ significantly 
between the three groups of firms, we use the joint sample and estimate the regression 
including the interaction of performance with group indicators. The estimates of the 
interaction terms, tPerformance group×  and 1tPerformance group− × , are tested for 
significance separately (t-test) and also jointly (F-test). We carry out tests of equality of 
coefficients for A vs. HR, A vs. HK, and HR vs. HK, as well as joint tests across the 
three types of firms, i.e. A vs. HR vs. HK. We test each set of performance variables 
separately and also test the four sets of performance variables jointly. The results are 
reported in Table 3. 
  Several important points emerge from Table 3: First, there is some evidence 
suggesting that the change in executive compensation is more sensitive to stock returns 
in HK firms than in cross-listed and A-share firms.  This result is mainly driven by the 
response of HK firms to the lagged stock return (stock return, t-1). It also appears that 
cross-listed companies are more similar to A-share companies than to HK companies in 
terms of executive incentives tied to stock returns. Moreover, despite being less sensitive 
to stock returns than HK firms, the first differencing estimates suggest A-share firms are 
still significantly sensitive to stock returns at t, which is consistent with the level 
estimates in Table 2. 
 Second, cross-listed firms have exceeded A-share and HK companies in the 
responsiveness of compensation changes with respect to sales growth. HK firms, on the 
other hand, are somewhat more sensitive to sales growth than A-share companies. When 
                                                                                                                                             
A-share companies, especially of those controlled by the state, is not sensitive to stock returns.  
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all four sets of performance variables are included in the regression, the differences 
between the three groups of firms are significant. 
Third, the estimates of the sensitivity of executive compensation changes to the 
change in ROA are positive and sizeable but are only marginally significant for A-share 
and cross-listed companies. After including other performance variables, the estimates 
become insignificant.   The comparison between groups did not produce significant 
patterns due to large standard errors. However, there is some weak evidence suggesting 
that A-share executive compensation changes may be more sensitive to the change in 
ROA than those of HK firms. 
Finally, the change in executive compensation of mainland firms seems to be 
more sensitive to losses, although the results are statistically insignificant. This result 
may be partially due to the strict rules imposed by the CSRC on profitability. According 
to CSRC regulations, A-share companies incurring losses for two consecutive years will 
be put under special treatment (ST). The companies with losses for three consecutive 
years face the risk of delisting. 
 Since ownership structure may have a significant impact on executive incentives, 
we also conduct an analysis controlling for ownership types. Descriptive results in Table 
1 show that the three types of companies have a similar level of shareholder 
concentration. Therefore, our focus is rather on the type of largest shareholder, 
specifically whether it is private or the state. For mainland and cross-listed companies, 
we estimate separate regressions when the largest shareholder is the state and when it is 
private. We also test the differences between the two situations. Since HK firms are all 
private, there is no need for separate regressions for them. The results are reported in 
Table 4.     
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As can be seen, for mainland A-share companies, the change in executive 
compensation is more sensitive to the change in ROA in state companies than in 
non-state companies, whereas in the non-state A-share companies, the change in the 
compensation is more sensitive to losses.  This result is likely due to the different 
evaluation and incentive systems for executives in state and non-state companies. In 
many cases the government still evaluates state companies based on their total profits 
and taxes paid (Tenev et al., 2002).  
For cross-listed companies, state and non-state firms are similar in terms of the 
relationship of executive compensation changes to stock returns and losses, but they 
differ significantly in the responsiveness to sales growth in that state companies that are 
cross-listed are more sensitive to sales growth than the non-state. Moreover, simple 
eyeballing suggests that the state-controlled cross-listed companies are also more 
sensitive to the change in ROA than the non-state controlled companies, but the 
statistical test of these differences is insignificant. Finally, the test of equality using all 
four sets of performance variables (groups A-D in Table 4) shows that for A-share 
companies, the differences between the state and the non-state are significant, while for 
cross-listed firms, the differences are not significant. This result suggests that 
cross-listing may help reduce the influence of government in state-controlled firms, and 
cause the state and non-state firms to adopt similar executive incentives in the foreign 
market.  
In any case, Table 4 suggests the necessity to distinguish state and non-state firms 
in the analysis. For this reason, we carry out additional tests of differences and report the 
results in Table 5. We compared A-share state companies with cross-listed state 
companies and with HK firms; and we also compared A-share non-state companies with 
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cross-listed non-state companies and with HK firms. These results show that the earlier 
results in Table 3 suggesting that the change in executive compensation of cross-listed 
companies is sensitive to sales growth is actually mostly driven by the behavior of 
state-controlled cross-listed firms, while the sensitivity of mainland companies to losses 
is mainly due to private firms. Moreover, state-controlled A-share firms appear to be 
particularly sensitive to the changes in ROA. 
 Overall, Table 5 shows that, for non-state companies, the differences between 
cross-listed and A-share companies are insignificant, while for state companies, the 
differences are significant. These results are consistent with Table 4, suggesting that 
cross-listing has a greater impact on state-controlled companies than on non-state 
controlled companies. For state-controlled companies, cross-listing has been associated 
with the change in the performance indicator used to determine executive pay raises 
(from ROA to sales growth).  For non-state companies, the changes in executive 
incentives are not apparent. 
4. Summary and Conclusion  
 In conclusion, we find that the pattern of response of executive compensation to 
firm performance differs among mainland companies cross-listed in Hong Kong, 
mainland companies that are not cross-listed, and HK firms.  Executive compensation in 
cross-listed companies is more sensitive to sales growth than mainland firms, but less 
sensitive to stock returns than HK firms. When state and non-state firms are separately 
examined, we find that in the state-controlled cross-listed firms the change in executive 
compensation is responsive to sales growth, while in the non-state controlled companies 
the incentives tied to sales growth are not much different from the companies without 
cross-listing. Moreover, for mainland A-share companies, we find that changes in 
 20
executive compensation are particularly sensitive to the changes in ROA in the 
state-controlled firms while changes in executive compensation are sensitive to losses in 
the non-state controlled firms.  This finding suggests that the state and non-state 
controlled companies differ in terms of which performance measure carries the most 
weight in determining executive pay increases - in the case of the state-controlled firms, 
it is ROA, while for non-state controlled firms the pay raises are more sensitive to losses. 
These results provide some evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
cross-listing is associated with a stronger relationship between executive compensation 
and firm performance. The hypothesis is supported when performance is measured by 
sales growth, particularly for state-controlled companies. Furthermore, our study shows 
that cross-listing may have a greater impact on executive incentives in state companies 
and reduce differences between state and non-state controlled companies traded in Hong 
Kong. Nevertheless, both types of companies still differ from HK local firms in their 
sensitivity of executive compensation changes to stock returns.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for mainland, Hong Kong and cross-listed firms 
Sample Group   A    HR    HK   Test of differences 
Variables  Mean Median STD N Mean Median STD N Mean Median STD N A vs. HR A vs. HK HR vs. HK 
A. Compensation              
Cash compensation  33.75 25.06 37.38 590 180.90 77.30 384.35 551 479.31 249.14 745.41 536 16.98*** 26.41*** 14.16*** 
Change in cash 
compensation   0.07 0.06 0.39 387  0.16 0.11 0.51 349  0.07 0.02 0.45   327   2.43
*** 1.77*  3.64*** 
Management shareholding  0.01 0  0.03 528 10.64 0.07 20.76 554 42.05 47.77 22.86 543 13.61*** 20.79*** 11.88*** 
                 
B. Financial Variables                 
Market value of equity  3923.38 2099.78 6640.20 602 15075.85 1566.02 73976.52 586 9226.57 903.42 27148.77 590 3.65*** 8.26*** 2.85*** 
Stock returns  0.11 -0.05 0.57 605 0.26 0.05 0.83 553 0.31 0.09 0.94 583 3.77*** 5.60*** 1.59 
Sales  3629.84 1554.79 6810.24 596 18297.66 2014.11 74895.80 590 4872.29 1150.83 14338.71 605 2.53*** 4.35*** 6.19*** 
Sales growth  0.09 0.14 1.18 596 0.22 0.18 0.84 589 0.09 0.08 0.77 605 3.01*** 2.91*** 5.61*** 
ROA  0.00 0.02 0.16 597 0.03 0.04 0.13 584 0.02 0.04 0.96 601 6.63*** 4.83*** 1.23 
Change in ROA  -0.01 0  0.14 597 0  0  0.50 583 -0.03 0  4.24 601 1.35 0.58 1.54 
Loss  0.22 0  0.41 597 0.23 0  0.42 584 0.29 0  0.45 601 0.55 2.97*** 2.72*** 
Leverage  0.54 0.54 0.24 594 0.79 0.57 0.55 584 0.66 0.50 0.91 605  4.60*** 0.33 3.69*** 
LnAssets  12.59 12.61 1.03 597 13.01 13.11 2.06 590 12.11 12.12 2.23 605  4.22*** 5.20*** 6.94*** 
                 
C. Other Characteristics                 
Ownership Concentration  49.94 40.70 190.93 528 50.82 52.72 17.90 554 47.24 49.76 18.28 543 8.18*** 4.91*** 2.99*** 
State  0.76 1 0.43 570 0.82 1 0.38 595     2.82***   
Years of listing  8.68 8 2.68 608 8.18 7 7.82 396 11.66 11 7.75 434 6.13*** 5.73*** 8.65*** 
Note: This table shows summary statistics of compensation, financial variables, and other characteristics of three groups of firms for 2004-2006. HR indicates cross-listed firms; A refers to mainland 
A-share firms; HK indicates Hong Kong local firms. To test differences across groups, the Wilcoxon signed rank test is used for continuous variables and the Chi-square frequency test is used for 
dummy variables, and test statistics are reported. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 2: Regression of the level of executive compensation on performance  
Dependent variable: the logarithm of annual compensation 
Independent variables 2004 2005 2006 2004-2006 pooled 
HR 1.077
*** 
(8.38) 
0.970*** 
(8.90) 
1.213*** 
(10.35) 
1.119*** 
(12.82) 
HK 2.373
*** 
(21.13) 
2.351*** 
(24.78) 
2.598*** 
(26.44) 
2.503*** 
(33.81) 
A × Stock return, t  0.590
*** 
(2.61) 
0.756*** 
(2.79) 
0.228*** 
(3.12) 
0.235*** 
(4.49) 
HR × Stock return, t  0.560
*** 
(2.65) 
0.046 
(0.21) 
-0.018 
(-0.27) 
0.041 
(0.70) 
HK× Stock return, t  0.008 
(0.23) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.183*** 
(-2.54) 
-0.034 
(-1.05) 
A × ROA, t  1.561 
(1.33) 
0.788 
(1.00) 
0.305 
(1.16) 
0.713** 
(2.10) 
HR × ROA, t  -2.313
* 
(-1.60) 
-0.688 
(-1.48) 
-0.544 
(-1.34) 
-0.727* 
(-1.64) 
HK × ROA, t  0.078 
(1.28) 
0.391 
(1.01) 
1.760** 
(2.30) 
0.015 
(0.30) 
Sales growth, t -0.015 
(-1.28) 
-0.023** 
(-1.93) 
-0.010** 
(-2.25) 
-0.014** 
(-2.19) 
Leverage -0.023 
(-0.32) 
-0.198 
(-1.31) 
-0.234 
(-1.50) 
-0.119*** 
(-2.48) 
LnAssets 0.309
*** 
(11.82) 
0.344*** 
(15.85) 
0.322*** 
(13.79) 
0.337*** 
(16.93) 
Constant -0.168 
(-0.28) 
-0.199 
(-0.39) 
-0.016 
(-0.02) 
-0.335 
(-0.61) 
Industry dummies yes Yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes Yes yes yes 
Adj. 2R  .630 .698 .691 0.662 
Observations 531 525 467 1523 
Note: this table reports the estimates of the regression of the compensation level on firm characteristics and financial variables. HR indicates cross-listed firms; A refers to mainland A-share firms; HK 
indicates Hong Kong local firms.  t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Regression of the change in executive compensation on performance for mainland, Hong Kong, and cross-listed firms 
Dependent variable: Change in the logarithm of annual compensation  
  
By Individual Performance 
Variables Test of differences  
Including All Performance 
Variables Test of differences 
Independent variables   
A 
(1) 
HR 
(2) 
HK 
(3) 
A vs. HR
(4) 
A vs.HK
(5) 
HR vs.HK
(6) 
A vs. HR  
vs.HK 
(7) 
 A 
(8) 
HR 
(9) 
HK 
(10) 
A vs. HR
(11) 
A vs.HK
(12) 
HR vs.HK 
(13) 
A vs. HR 
vs. HK 
(14) 
A. Stock return                 
  Stock return, t 
 
.087*** 
(2.81) 
.089***
(2.68)
.060**
(2.01)  
    
 
0.067**
(2.24)
0.077**
(2.28)
0.060**
(2.08)     
      Stock return, t-1 
 
0.036 
(0.53) 
0.004 
(0.05)
.097***
(2.89)      
-0.023
(-0.35)
-0.067
(-0.75)
0.088***
(2.69)  
† † † 
    Adj. 2R   .045 .059 .084             
 B. Sales growth     Ú        Ú Ú Ú Ú 
      Sales growth, t 
 
.017** 
(2.15) 
.140**
(2.11)
.051 
(1.25)
†    
 
0.006
(0.73)
0.190***
(3.42)
0.061*
(1.62)
†  † † 
      Sales growth, t-1 
   
.097** 
(2.43) 
0.074 
(1.44)
.087**
(2.17)      
0.053
(1.36)
0.149***
(3.47)
0.099***
(2.94)
†    
     Adj. 2R   .043 .058 .067             
C. Change in ROA                 
      Change in ROA, t 
 
.433* 
(1.78) 
.144 
(0.49)
-.003
(-0.29)  
†   
 
0.316
(1.25)
0.162
(0.65)
0.008
(0.95)    
 
      Change in ROA, t-1 
 
.116 
(0.34) 
.152* 
(1.75)
.005***
(6.24)      
-0.137
(-0.49)
0.117
(1.51)
0.008***
(5.48)    
 
   Adj. 2R   .040 .040 .050             
D. Loss                 
      Loss, t or t-1 
 
-.153*** 
(-2.82) 
-.113***
(-2.06)
-.060
(-1.44)      
-0.145**
(-2.40)
-0.067
(-1.08)
-0.016
(-0.36)    
 
    Adj. 2R   .053 .044 .047      .081 .111 .115     
Test of equality for groups A-D 
jointly 
            Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant  
Observations  373 302 304      373 302 304     
Note: this table reports the estimates of the regressions of the change in executive compensation on the change in firm characteristics and performance during 2004-2006. HR indicates cross-listed 
firms; A refers to mainland A-share firms; HK indicates Hong Kong local firms.  In columns (1)-(7), performance measures A-D are included individually in the regression. In columns (8)-(14), 
performance variables are included jointly. In all the regressions, the change in leverage, the change in lnAssets, and constant are included but not reported. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  † indicates that the differences between groups are significant at the 10 percent level or better. Ú 
indicates that the test of equality for  t and t-1 jointly is significant at the 10 percent level or better.  
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Table 4: Regression of the change in executive compensation on performance for state and non-state controlled mainland and cross-listed companies  
Dependent variable: Change in the logarithm of annual compensation 
   A       HR    
 
By Individual Performance 
Variables 
Test of 
difference
Including All Performance 
Variables 
Test of 
difference  
By Individual Performance 
Variables 
Test of 
difference
Including All Performance 
Variables 
Test of 
difference 
Independent variables 
State 
(1) 
Non-state 
(2) 
State vs. 
Non- state
(3) 
State 
(4) 
Non-state 
(5) 
State vs. 
Non- state
(6) 
 State 
(7) 
Non-state
(8) 
State vs.  
Non- state 
(9) 
State 
(10) 
Non-state
(11) 
State vs.  
Non- state 
(12) 
A. Stock return              
     Stock return, t 0.081
** 
(2.27) 
0.060 
(0.67)  
0.053* 
(1.59) 
-0.006 
(-0.06)   
0.088** 
(2.17) 
0.067 
(1.24)  
0.067 
(1.63) 
0.056 
(0.83)  
      Stock return, t-1 0.081 (1.01) 
-0.107 
(-0.76)  
-0.033 
(-0.42) 
-0.220 
(-1.25)   
0.026 
(0.29) 
-0.007 
(-0.04)  
-0.034 
(-0.34) 
-0.037 
(-0.17)  
    Adj. 2R  .043 .113      0.063 .128     
 B. Sales growth          Ú   Ú 
     Sales growth, t 0.066 (0.68) 
0.021*** 
(3.05)  
0.066 
(0.74) 
0.014*** 
(2.61)   
0.382*** 
(3.67) 
-0.083 
(-0.51) 
† 0.367
*** 
(3.37) 
0.027 
(0.15) 
† 
     Sales growth, t-1 
  
0.137* 
(1.79) 
0.042 
(0.87)  
0.072 
(1.07) 
0.009 
(0.16)   
-0.008 
(-0.21) 
0.015 
(0.10)  
0.047 
(0.92) 
0.073 
(0.41)  
     Adj. 2R  .040 .136      .108 .104     
C. Change in ROA   Ú   Ú        
     Change in ROA, t 1.822
*** 
(2.60) 
0.290* 
(1.53) 
† 1.701
** 
(2.51) 
0.152 
(0.74) 
† 
 
0.216 
(0.67) 
-0.768 
(0.92)  
0.275 
(1.11) 
-0.686 
(-0.59)  
     Change in ROA, t-1 1.949
*** 
(2.74) 
-0.336 
(-1.06) 
† 1.742
** 
(2.32) 
-0.407* 
(-1.76) 
† 
 
0.150* 
(1.84) 
0.061 
(0.12)  
0.092 
(1.29) 
-0.463 
(-0.49)  
    Adj. 2R  .104 .141      .044 .107     
D. Loss              
     Loss, t or t-1 -0.130
* 
(-1.77) 
-0.214** 
(-2.21)  
-0.024 
(-0.33) 
-0.273** 
(-2.25) 
† 
 
-0.133** 
(-2.37) 
-0.041 
(-0.23)  
-0.076 
(-1.27) 
-0.067 
(-0.26)  
    Adj. 2R  .037 .171  .123 .251   .049 .079  .152 .174  
Test of equality for groups 
A-D jointly       
Significant
(p=.004)        Insignificant 
Observations 269 82  269 82   256 46  256 46  
Note: this table reports the estimates of the change regressions for state and non-state companies separately during 2004-2006. HR indicates cross-listed firms; A refers to mainland A-share firms; HK 
indicates Hong Kong local firms.  State and Non-state indicate state and non-state controlled companies, respectively.  In columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9), performance measures A-D are included 
individually in the regression. In columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12), performance variables are included jointly. In all the regressions, the change in leverage, the change in lnAssets, and constant are 
included but not reported. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.  † indicates that the differences between groups 
are significant at the 10 percent level or better. Ú indicates that the test of equality for  t and t-1 jointly is significant at the 10 percent level or better.  
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Table 5: Tests of differences in the executive pay-for-performance sensitivity for mainland, Hong Kong and cross-listed firms by State 
Dependent variable: Change in the logarithm of annual compensation 
  By Individual Performance Variables    Including All Performance Variables  
Independent  
variables 
A-state 
vs. 
HR-state 
A-state 
vs. 
HK 
HR-state
vs. 
HK 
A-non-state 
vs. 
HR-non-state
A-non-state 
vs. 
HK 
HR-non-state
vs. 
HK  
A-state
vs. 
HR-state
A-state  
vs. 
HK 
HR-state  
vs. 
HK 
A-non-state 
vs. 
HR-non-state
A-non-state  
vs. 
HK 
HR-non-state  
vs. 
HK 
A. Stock return              
    Stock return, t              
    Stock return, t-1     †       †  
 B. Sales growth   Ú(-)     Ú  Ú(-)  Ú  
    Sales growth, t †  †(-)     †  †(-)    
    Sales growth, t-1    †           
C. Change in ROA Ú(-) Ú(-)      Ú(-) Ú(-)     
    Change in ROA, t †(-) †(-)   †(-)   †(-) †(-)     
    Change in ROA, t-1 †(-) †(-)      †(-) †(-)   †  
D. Loss              
    Loss, t or t-1            †(-)  
Test of equality for 
groups A-D jointly        
Significant
(p=.046)
Significant
(p=.021) Insignificant Insignificant  
Significant 
(p=.001) Insignificant 
Note:  this table reports the test of equality between different groups of companies in terms of the sensitivity of executive compensation changes to 
firm performance. A-state and A-non-state refer to state and non-state controlled A-share companies, respectively. HR-state and HR-non-state 
indicate state and non-state controlled cross-listed companies. HK indicates Hong Kong local firms, which are all private companies. † indicates that 
the difference is significant at the 10 percent level or better. Ú indicates that the test of equality for  t and t-1 jointly is significant at the 10 percent level 
or better. The hypothesis is: A-shares’ executive compensation change is less sensitive to performance than that of cross-listed companies (HR) which 
is then less sensitive than that of HK firms. (-) indicates that the direction is opposite to the hypothesis.  
 
